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policy of the state. It was their contention
that the law of New York has always
looked at the gambler as an outlaw, and
considered the operation of a gambling
house a crime. This historic fact is so indicative of New York's public policy that
our courts must be closed to the type of
suit herein involved. The very facts that
casino gambling is today outlawed and the
contract, if made here, would likewise be
illegal, clearly express New York's public
policy and therefore all other considerations are irrelevant.
The legalization of pari-mutuel betting
and bingo is not believed to indicate a
trend; rather the people of this state have
differentiated between these forms of gambling and the kind here in question. The
minority underlines its position by emphasizing the fact that while pari-mutuel betting and bingo are legal in many states,
only one state (Nevada) licenses gambling
casinos.2 -' The conclusion of the minority
was that the operation of a gambling house
is definitely contrary to New York's public
policy and that our courts should refuse
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plaintiff's claim regardless of comity or
principles of the law of contracts.
The instant case defines those factors
which will be given consideration by the
courts in determining our state's public
policy. The public policy of this state is
not determinable by mere reference to our
domestic laws. The legality or illegality of
the activity upon which the foreign right is
based is not to be given sole consideration. Courts must now look beyond a literal interpretation of the law, and give cognizance to the prevailing "social and moral
3
attitudes of the community."2
Under the concept of public policy advanced by the instant case, it would seem
that all foreign-based contractual rights, if
valid where made, are entitled to enforcement in New York unless inherently heinous or clearly violative of our basic moral
tenets, the obvious example of which
would be a contract to commit a crime.
Aside from this obvious case, the problem
arises as to exactly how and by what means
a court is to determine the prevailing moral
attitude of the members of a community
on any given question.

'2 Id. at 19, 203 N.E.2d at 215, 254 N.Y.S.2d at

534. Even in Nevada gambling debts cannot be
the basis for a valid lawsuit. Nevada Tax Comm.
v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 115, 310 P.2d 852 (1957).

Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, supra
note 16, at 14, 203 N.E.2d at 212, 254 N.Y.S.2d at
530-31.

Homosexuality-A New
Ground for Annulment?

have normal sexual relations, in addition
to concealing the fact that he was a homosexual. The allegation that the defendant
concealed the fact that he was a homosexual was dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence, while the other factual issues
presented to the jury were resolved in
favor of annulment. The Appellate Divi-

Plaintiff petitioned the court to annul
the marriage of her deceased niece to the
defendant. Petitioner alleged that the defendant had induced his wife to enter the
marriage by fraudulently misrepresenting
his age, origin, ancestry and his intent to
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sion affirmed in a three-two decision, holding that the questions of misrepresentation
were factual and that the determinations
of the jury were not against the weight of
the evidence. Sophian v. Von Linde, (App.
Div. 1st Dep't), 152 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 15,
1964, p. 1, col. 7.
In an annulment action in New York, a
petitioner may successfully proceed on the
ground of fraud.' In order to make out a
prima facie case, a premarital fraudulent
intent must be established.2 In addition,
the petitioner must prove he was induced
to enter into the marriage by a fraudulent
misrepresentation of an essential or material fact.3 Thus, New York courts require
that the misrepresentation be the "but for"
cause of the marriage and one upon which
an ordinary prudent man would rely.4 Furthermore, it must be proved by evidence
which is "substantial and reliable enough
to satisfy the conscience of the trier of the
facts." 5

IN.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 140(e); De BailletLatour v. De Baillet-Latour, 301 N.Y. 428, 94
N.E.2d 715 (1950); Roger v. Roger, 24 Misc. 2d
566, 198 N.Y.S.2d 657 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
2 Roger
v. Roger, supra note 1, at 567, 198
N.Y.S.2d at 659. Under this view a "change
of heart" after marriage, e.g., not to have children, would be insufficient grounds for annulment.
3 Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467,
471, 67 N.E. 63, 64 (1903); LONG, DOMESTIC
RELATIONS § 42 (3d ed. 1923).
4 Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, supra note 3, at
474-75, 67 N.E. at 65; accord, Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 N.Y. 477, 184 N.E. 60 (1933). The
fraud complained of must not be as to trifles.
See, e.g., Woronzoff-Daschkoff v. WoronzoffDaschkoff, 303 N.Y. 506, 104 N.E.2d 877
(1952); Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 160 App. Div.
48, 144 N.Y. Supp. 774 (2d Dep't 1913); Griffin v. Griffin, 122 Misc. 837, 204 N.Y. Supp. 131
(Sup. Ct.), afI'd, 209 App. Div. 833, 205 N.Y.
Supp. 926 (2d Dep't 1924).
Roger v. Roger, supra note 1, at 568, 198
N.Y.S.2d at 659; accord, De Baillet-Latour v.

Certain instances of fraudulent concealment can categorically be said to provide
grounds for annulment.6 Concealment of
an intent not to have normal sexual relations with the marriage partner is one example. The view of a majority of the New
York courts is that when one enters into
the marriage contract, he or she impliedly
promises to perform all the duties incident
thereto. Engaging in normal sexual rela7
tions is such a duty.
In New York, a misrepresentation as to
a person's social status, origin, citizenship,
fortune or temper may be of such a character as to be a material misrepresentation
upon which an annulment can be granted.8
De Baillet-Latour, supra note 1, at 434, 94 N.E.
2d at 717. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 144(2) requires
that "in any action, whether or not contested,
brought to annul a marriage, the declaration or
confession of either party to the marriage is not
alone sufficient as proof, but other satisfactory
evidence of the facts must be produced."
6
E.g., Smith v. Smith, 112 Misc. 371, 184 N.Y.
Supp. 134 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (hereditary insanity);
Sobal v. Sobal, 88 Misc. 277, 150 N.Y. Supp. 248
(Sup. Ct. 1914) (tuberculosis); Fontana v. Fontana, 77 Misc. 28, 135 N.Y. Supp. 220 (Sup. Ct.
1912) (pregnancy by another at the time of
marriage); Anonymous, 21 Misc. 765, 49 N.Y.
Supp. 331 (Sup. Ct. 1897) (venereal disease).
7 Fundaro v. Fundaro, 272 App. Div. 825, 70
N.Y.S.2d 510 (2d Dep't 1947); Eldredge v. Eldredge, 43 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Note,
48 COLUM. L. REV. 900 (1948).
8 See Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, supra note 4. Since
Shonfeld, marriages have been annulled for the
following misrepresentations: fraudulent misrepresentation as to love and affection (Miodownik
v. Miodownik, 259 App. Div. 851, 19 N.Y.S.2d
175 (2d Dep't 1940) ); husband represented that
he was of good character when he had pleaded
guilty to a felony (Graves v. Graves, 27 'Misc.
2d 436, 52 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ); misrepresentation as to American citizenship (Laage
v. Laage, 176 Misc. 190, 26 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sup.
Ct. 1941) ); misrepresentation inducing wealthy
man to marry a foreign girl who intended no
permanent relationship (Ryan v. Ryan, 156 Misc.
251, 281 N.Y. Supp. 709 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ). See
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However, the general rule in other jurisdictions is that misrepresentations as to fortune, social position, character and other
personal traits do not affect the validity of
a marriage. 9
Case law dealing with fraud as a ground
for annulment appears relatively settled
except in the area of concealment of homosexuality, an examination of which presents several interesting problems.' 0 Many
jurisdictions have considered the legal difficulties involved in this area, and with
varying degrees of consistency have regarded homosexuality as a ground for divorce." However, it appears that no jurisdiction has yet employed it as a basis for
annulment. Since homosexuality is traditionally neither a ground for divorce nor
annulment in New York, its courts have
never been squarely faced with these prob-

generally Note, Annulment of Marriage for
Fraud, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 424 (1947); see also
Drexler, Annulment of Marriage for Fraud in
New York, 71 U.S.L. REV. 318 (1937).
9 E.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 212 Cal. 736, 300
Pac. 816 (1931); Williams v. Williams, 32 Del.

39, 118 Atl. 638 (1922); Heath v. Heath, 85 N.H.
419, 159 AtI. 418 (1932). Unlike New York,
most states will not annul a marriage merely because the fraud is the "but for" cause of the
marriage. Only when the fraud goes to the essentials of the marriage relation, such as a concealment of a disease which would -make marital
intercourse dangerous, will they grant an annulment. See 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1240 (1933); 32
CORNELL L.Q. 424 (1947); 46 HARV. L. REV.
1034 (1933).
10See

generally Cavanagh,

Sex and the Law

-- A Symposium: I Sexual Anomalies, 9 CATHOLIC LAW. 4, 23-25 (1963); Ritty, Sex and the
Law-A Symposium, 10 CATHOLIC LAW. 90
(1964); Coburn, Homosexuality and the Invalidation of Marriage, 20 JURIST 441 (1960).
11 E.g., Currie v. Currie, 120 Fla. 28, 162 So.
152 (1935); Crutcher v. Crutcher, 86 Miss. 231,
38 So. 337 (1905); H. v. H., 59 N.J. Super. 227,
157 A.2d 721 (1959); Santos v. Santos, 80 R.I. 5,
90 A.2d 771 (1952).
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lems. 1' Consequently, none has explained
when and if homosexuality may be used as
a basis for annuling the marriage.
In the instant case, the Court found that
sufficient evidence had been presented to
the jury to justify an annulment on the
basis of the alleged misrepresentation by
the defendant of his age, origin, and ancestry, and also upon his concealment of a
preconceived intent not to engage in normal sexual relations. Although the dismissal of the action based on homosexuality was affirmed, the Court stated that such
dismissal was not on the merits, and implied that had sufficient evidence been introduced tending to establish the defendant's homosexual inclinations, an annulment might possibly have been granted on
that ground alone.
The dissenting justices did not believe
that the evidence produced at the trial was
sufficient to annul the marriage on the
basis of the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations by the defendant as to his age,
origin and ancestry or the concealment by
him of his intention not to have normal
sexual relations. However, the minority
found that the evidence introduced to
establish the defendant's homosexuality
was sufficient to "justify a jury granting the
annulment. ... .'"Despite the disagreement between the majority and minority
12

In Cohen v. Cohen, 200 Misc. 19, 103 N.Y.S.

2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1951), a New York court refused to grant a divorce to a wife who proved
her husband committed sodomy. The court stated
that New York has no common-law jurisdiction
over the subject of divorce. Consequently, since
the only statutory ground for divorce is adultery,
and since the plaintiff had not established that
ground, she could not succeed. The court expressed no opinion as to whether it would have
granted an annulment on the same facts.
13 Sophian v. Von Linde, (App. Div. 1st Dep't),
152 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 15, 1964, p. 3, col. 3 (dissenting opinion).
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as to the sufficiency of proof, both opinions seemingly agree that an annulment
might well be granted upon the presentation of ample evidence of the homosexuality of a marriage partner.
It seems surprising that despite New
York's comprehensive treatment of annulment, the problem of homosexuality has
never been adequately considered. The instant case indicates only that under some
undefined circumstances, homosexuality
might provide the basis for annulment.
However, the Court does not consider the
consequent problems that may result in its
4
application.1
When the issue next comes before the
courts, different approaches may be utilized in its resolut'on. In granting an annulment, the court could rely on traditional
grounds. For example, since homosexuality is partly psychological, one basis for
5
the annulment could b2 mental disease.'
Another traditional ground for the annulment could be impotency, 1 for it is reported that fifty per cent of genuine homosexuals are functionally impotent.' 7 In addition, if the homosexual is incapable of
consummating the marriage, or is incapable thereafter of engaging in normal sexual relations, and had concealed this fact
before the marriage, the court could use
fraud as the basis for annulment."'
Difficult problems could arise if the
homosexual activity complained of does
14 For a general discussion of homosexuality, see
THE LAW 195-215 (1st ed.
1951).
15 See Note, supra note 8; see also Drexler,
supra note 8. Cf. ASS'N OF AMERICAN LAW
SCHOOLS, SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW 352
(1950).
11For an excellent discussion, see Annot., 65
A.L.R.2d 776 (1959).
17 Coburn, supra note 10, at 458.
18 See authorities cited note 7 supra.

not fall within traditional categories.' 9 Suppose, for example, that a person has engaged in occasional acts of homosexuality
prior to marriage.' 0 Suppose, further, that
he does not view himself as a homosexual
and has no aversion to heterosexual relations. He then meets someone of the opposite sex, marries, and consummates the
marriage. Both partners engage in normal
sexual relations and perform all the duties
incident to the marriage. Subsequently,
however, an old "acquaintance" appears
and a homosexual act is committed. His
spouse discovers this and petitions the
court to annul the marriage. Ostensibly,
the court must determine the grounds upon
which to predicate the annulment. Since
the respondent did not view himself as a
homosexual, there was no preconceived intent to deceive and, hence, fraud could not
be a basis for the annulment. 21 Palpably,
impotency would be inapplicable here. In
addition, the court would probably be hard
put to grant the annulment for mental
disease on the basis of one overt act of
homosexuality committed after the marriage. Analogous difficulties are apparent
when we consider the latent homosexual.
As distinguished from the bisexual or
pseudohomosexual described above, the
acts of homosexuality on the part of the
latent homosexual may initially occur after
2
marriage.
Although the impotency of the genuine
homosexual will provide a basis for annulment, it is apparent that the behavior of

PLOSCOWE, SEX AND

"Freitag
v. Freitag, 40 Misc. 2d 163, 242
N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
2"Kinsey reports that thirty-seven per cent of
the male population has had some homosexual
experience after the beginning of adolescence.
PLOSCOWE, op. cit. supra note 14, at 207.
2L
22

Cases and statute cited notes 1 & 2 supra.
See authorities cited note 10 suprd.

11
the pseudohomosexual and latent homosexual may not fall within the traditional
categories and, hence, many suits grounded
upon such behavior must fail unless a new
ground for annulment is created, viz.,
homosexual activity per se. Homosexuality is regarded by many jurisdictions as an
infamous indignity to the marriage partner,
which makes the marriage so revolting that
it becomes impossible for the other party to
discharge the marital duties, and defeats
23
the entire purpose of the marital relation.
If New York is willing to accept the

23

See authorities cited note 11 supra. Much of

the sexual satisfaction of male and female homosexuals involves behavior that violates sodomy

and crime-against-nature statutes. PLOSCOWE, op.
cit. supra note 14, at 195-208.

College Education Held a
"Necessary" in Alimony Decree
Petitioner sought modification of a prior
support order to include payment for her
son's college education. The Family Court
of New York, in ordering the father to pay
an additional fifteen dollars a week during
the school year, held that a father's duty
to educate his children includes the providing of a college education if the child
exhibits "special aptitude" and the father
has the ability to pay. Weingast v. Weingast, 255 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Family Ct. 1964).
A father, whether or not he has custody
of his children, is required to provide them
with "necessaries." 1 While some degree
1 39 AM.

JUR.

Parent & Child § 41 (1942).
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proposition that homosexual activity is so
revolting as to defeat the whole purpose
of the marital relation, and is willing to
apply this rationale to suits for annulment,
then homosexual activity per se might be
considered a basis for annulling the marriage. This approach may be feasible in
view of New York's strict divorce laws
which do not provide any escape from the
marriage for a party suffering such indignities. However, if New York does recognize homosexual activity per se as a ground
for annulment on the theory that it defeats the purpose of the marital relation,
it will then have to deal with the additional
problems of defining and classifying those
types and degrees of homosexual activity
which do in fact make marriage unworkable.

of education was deemed a "necessary" at
common law 2 one of the earliest reported
cases in this country, Middlebury College
v. Chandler3 held that a college education
is not a "necessary." The court in that case
denied a student's claim that his father's
estate was liable for tuition in his stead, on
the ground that his father would have been
liable for his "necessaries."
Eighty years later, in the leading case
of Esteb v. Esteb 4 the Washington Supreme Court deemed a college education,
under the facts and circumstances involved,
a "necessary," and ordered a divorced
2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 450 (American
ed. 1847).
3 16 Vt. 683, 42 Am. Dec. 537 (1844).
4 138 Wash. 174, 244 Pac. 264 (1926).

